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Abstract
This paper explores the impacts of sovereign defaults on trade and income
through a real exchange rate channel, in a DSGE model of two risk-averse open
economies, with production. In the model, once the borrower country defaults
due to an adverse productivity shock, foreign firms reduce their imports of inter-
mediate goods from the defaulting country, whose income consequently declines.
This causes the defaulting country to adjust its consumption portfolio of domes-
tic goods and imports according to its home bias preference, triggers a collapse
in its real exchange rate, and leads to a further endogenous plummet in national
income. This paper makes three main contributions. First, along business cycles,
the model generates countercyclical trade balances, procyclical trade flows, and
countercyclical bond spreads with a data-consistent average. Second, following a
sovereign default, the model endogenously delivers sharp real exchange rate de-
terioration, output drops, trade balance improvements, and bilateral trade flow
declines. This paper thus also studies a real exchange rate channel, through
which default risks and occurrences, income, and trade interact with each other.
Lastly, this model predicts lasting welfare gains for the creditor country through
the real exchange rate channel, but relatively short-lived welfare losses for the
borrower country and the world during and after a sovereign default.
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1 Introduction
Sovereign default events are associated with three empirical regularities: (a) deep reces-
sions, (b) international goods trade declines with reversed balance, and (c) falling real
exchange rates. Recent evidence shows that, across countries, default episodes have on
average been accompanied by a GDP drop of 5 percent below trend, a bilateral trade
value decline of 8 percent, a net export increase of about 10 percentage points of GDP,
and real depreciation of around 30-50 percent.1
The existing quantitative sovereign debt literature, such as Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006), Arellano (2008), and Mendoza and Yue (2012), based on Eaton and Gerso-
vitz (1981), has made significant contributions in accounting for countercyclical net
exports and other key empirical patterns of the default episodes of developing coun-
tries. However, those small open economy models do not address defaults’ interactions
with 1) bilateral trade flows, 2) real exchange rates, and 3) creditors’ welfare. Using
a two-country model with endogenous defaultable bonds and goods trade, this paper
addresses these three aspects, which are largely left out of the current literature.
First, this paper’s theoretical model is able to study default-triggered changes of
both trade balances and bilateral trade, with separate import and export flows. As
emphasized by the empirical literature, it is not only that trade surpluses improve
during default episodes, but also that bilateral trade declines (Rose, 2005). This paper,
using a two-country model, helps us understand how a country’s consumer preferences
regarding domestic products and imports affect its propensity to default (Rose and
Spiegel, 2004; Rose, 2005). Past empirical research suggests that less outward-oriented
sovereigns are more willing to default. Therefore, if a sovereign government internalizes
its citizens’ desire for imported goods, we can begin to consider how a country’s reduced
desire for foreign goods can spur defaults, or how we can motivate the country to service
its debt on time.
Moreover, trade balances in previous default models have been calculated as a resid-
ual of output from consumption, which means that it depends mainly on capital flows.
More importantly, in those models, once default-triggered credit market exclusion hap-
pens, the trade balances become zero, which is inconsistent with the data. This paper’s
trade balances, however, result not only from capital flows, but also from consumers’
home bias preferences and their consumption smoothing incentive in both countries.
1See Rose (2005), Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), and Mendoza and Yue (2012).
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This feature also enables the trade balances to be nonzero endogenously during default
episodes, even though both countries are in financial autarky.2
Second, without the exchange rate it is difficult in a model to distinguish the sources
of changes to output, import, and export values after a default: by how much the
changes are due to depreciation (price effect), and by how much the changes can be
attributed to activity volume changes (quantity effect). For example, the first row of
Figure 1 shows the average annual growth rates of real effective exchange rate, and
GDP value (in USD) and volume around 39 default events over 1977-2009. Upon
default (year 0), on average GDP volume growth rate declined a lot less than GDP
value, if at all. The majority of the countries’ losses of output growth came from real
depreciation relative to US dollars.
In addition, the second and third rows of Figure 1 present the annual growth dy-
namics of trade value (in USD), trade volume, and trade-to-GDP ratio around default
events. In general, during the year of sovereign default, the growth rates of both export
value and import value turn negative, and the import value declines more significantly
than the export value does. Interestingly, most of the decline in export value does not
come from changes in export volume but from the real depreciation, since on average
export volume growth remains positive through default events. On the contrary, about
half of the decline in import value can be attributed to declines in import volumes,
and the other half to the real depreciation. It is clear that exchange rate deterioration
plays an important role in affecting how the import/export value change. In terms of
shares of GDP, the growth of export-to-GDP ratio also becomes much more positive
than that of import-to-GDP ratio. All of these facts point to the stylized fact of trade
balance improvement during a default event. In sum, it is useful to distinguish the
price and quantity effects during default events through an exchange rate channel, in
order to study how defaults affect bilateral trade and output losses.
Furthermore, the inclusion of the real exchange rate (i.e., terms of trade) in my
model also results in an endogenous default penalty, which, in turn, affects a country’s
ex ante incentive to default. Therefore, the default penalty of this model does not have
to rely on an exogenous output loss as in most previous default models. In this respect,
this paper is similar to Mendoza and Yue (2012), where it endogenizes the output loss
2Among default models, Mendoza and Yue (2012) is an exception, in that its trade balances are
also nonzero during defaults. But they are results of exogenous capital flows independent of default
or borrowing decisions.
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Figure 1: Growth around Sovereign Default Episodes (in percent)
Note: The statistics are based on 39 sovereign default episodes over 1977-2009. Due to data
limitation, the sample period and/or the number of default episodes vary slightly for some variables.
Raw data sources are detailed in the Appendix.
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by a production efficiency loss due to default-triggered exclusion from credit markets
that finance parts of the defaulting country’s imported intermediate inputs. However,
its price index for imported inputs declines during default episodes, since parts of the
imports are no longer used, which implies better terms of trade. This leaves it unclear
how consistent their paper’s real exchange rate movements are with the data. In this
paper, the real exchange rate is instead explicitly modeled as terms of trade by two
countries’ trade flows according to consumer preferences. The endogenous output and
the default (risk) affect each other through the real exchange rate channel prior to and
during a default event.
Third, with small open economy default models the previous literature is well estab-
lished in studying defaulting countries’ macroeconomic dynamics and welfare changes.
However, studies of creditor countries after default events, the other half of this lending-
borrowing relationship, are largely absent. Important questions to ask are: how is the
welfare of creditor countries affected by default events? Do they register loss or gain
from other countries’ defaults, and through which mechanisms? This paper’s two coun-
try model is able to look into the side of creditor countries.
Filling these aforementioned gaps, this paper studies the connection between de-
fault, international trade, and exchange rates in a two-country dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model. It features endogenous default and endogenous output and
international trade losses with endogenous real exchange rate deterioration. In the
model, two risk-averse open economies trade one-period discount bonds, produce two
unique final goods, respectively, and consume both through trade. One of the coun-
tries faces stochastic productivity and has an option to default on the bonds, whereas
the other country has constant productivity and never defaults. The country with no
default risk also purchases intermediate goods that are made by foreign workers in the
other country with default risk, to produce its own final goods. In practice, this can
be considered as intermediate inputs from abroad through vertical FDI and offshoring.
Since I use real economies, the nominal exchange rate is fixed at 1 and the real exchange
rate is defined to be terms of trade.
Default can be triggered by negative productivity shocks and can arise in equilib-
rium. Bond price is determined jointly by the supply from borrower country and the
demand from creditor country. The creditor takes into account sovereign default prob-
ability in its bond demand function. The bond is denominated by the final goods of the
country with no default risk. As the country with default risk borrows more and more,
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its default risk and equilibrium bond interest rate rise. Higher cost of debt reduces the
country’s available funds to smooth consumption, and thus due to consumption home
bias, the country will consume fewer imports. This puts downward pressure on the
real exchange rate, preventing it from appreciating and from helping the country pay
back debts.
Once the borrower defaults due to an adverse productivity shock, both countries
face financial autarky and only with a certain probability can they resume bond trad-
ing again. Moreover, the default affects foreign firms’ activities (including FDI, off-
shoring, intermediate goods purchases, etc.) related to the defaulting country more
than it affects domestic firms.3 In particular, the default triggers an efficiency loss
of foreign-firm-related intermediate goods production in the defaulting country (e.g.,
due to crisis-elevated miscommunication between foreign firms and intermediate goods
sector), which results in a decline of intermediate goods exports from the defaulting
country to the creditor country.
This is consistent with the data in Table 1. It shows the average annual growth
rates of exports for the sample period of 1989-2013, as well as for 15 default episodes
during that period (see Table 5 in the Appendix for detailed data availability). On
average, intermediate goods exports shrink during defaults, contradictory to its pattern
if including normal time. The growth rates of intermediate goods exports are smaller
than those of final goods exports during defaults, especially in terms of volume growth.
The impact of defaults on intermediate goods export growth distinguishes itself from
that on other export growth through a more severe decline.
This change in intermediate goods exports upon default triggers a reallocation of
capital and labor inputs within both countries, as well as another income loss additional
to that from the initial adverse productivity shock in the defaulting country.4 Conse-
quently, again because of consumption home bias preference, the defaulting country’s
imports decline even more, trade balances reverse, and the real exchange rate drops
sharply. The real depreciation further takes a toll on the defaulting country’s income.
3Multiple papers have provided evidence for asymmetric crisis impacts on domestic and foreign
agents due to crisis-elevated information asymmetry and risk aversion, for example, Brennan and Cao
(1997), Tille and van Wincoop (2008), Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2010), and Broner, Didier, Erce,
and Schmukler (2013). Moreover, Aizenman and Marion (2004) also documents that greater supply
uncertainty reduces the expected income from vertical FDI. Fuentes and Saravia (2010) find that a
default event can reduce FDI inflows by 72 percent.
4See details in the Model section.
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Table 1: Average Growth Rate of Exports During a Default (in percent)
Variable 1989-2013 During Default
Intermediate Goods Exports
Value 7.51 −1.11
Volume 4.92 0.82
Share of GDP 3.60 −1.92
Final Goods Exports
Value 7.65 −0.11
Volume∗ 5.96 7.81
Share of GDP 3.74 −1.02
Note: I collected annual growth data of final goods and intermediate goods export
value (in USD), volume (as value in local currency), and as a ratio to GDP for 15
sovereign default episodes over the period of 1989-2013. ∗Here, due to data
limitation, the volume is of total exports.
This builds into the model an endogenous real exchange rate mechanism by which a
sovereign default amplifies the effects of adverse productivity shocks on output and
trade.
In a quantitative exercise, I apply the model to study the Mexican debt crises
in the 1980s and the country’s business cycles for the period of 1981Q1-2012Q4.5 I
show that this two-country setup with endogenous real exchange rate changes allows
default models to explain the aforementioned stylized facts of sovereign defaults. In
particular, this paper generates three important stylized empirical features of emerging
markets’ business cycles, including sovereign default episodes. First, this paper delivers
countercyclical trade balances and procyclical trade flows over business cycles. Second,
the model supports high bond spreads that are also countercyclical. Third, this model
accounts for sharp real depreciation, GDP drops, trade balance improvements, and
bilateral trade flow declines during and right after a default.
Then I further examine the role of the real depreciation in explaining the default-
triggered changes to the borrower country’s trade value and volume, GDP value and
volume, and the creditor country’s welfare. The model generates trade and GDP losses
that are partially due to real depreciation (price effect) and partially due to volume
5I choose Mexico for this two-country model because Mexico has a relatively large open economy
among the countries that recently defaulted, as well as relatively large vertically integrated sectors
involved with foreign production, including its maquiladora sector (Zlate, 2012).
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changes (quantity effect), as in the data. I also find that the creditor country’s wel-
fare experiences lasting gains from a default event, mainly because of their improved
terms of trade. Moreover, the model can predict the time series of Mexican output and
bond spreads in the sample period, as well as its crises around 1986 and 1995. Lastly,
in sensitivity analysis, this paper finds that the changes in default penalty (through
exchange rate and intermediate goods exports) and consumers’ taste in imported fi-
nal goods versus domestic goods have little impact on the borrower country’s default
frequency, but do have a great impact on its average debt-to-GDP ratio and on the
post-default welfare of the borrower, the creditor, and the world.
In explaining the defaulting country’s trade balance reversal and deteriorating real
exchange rate and terms of trade, this model is related to papers in the international
business cycle literature, such as Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992, 1994), Stock-
man and Tesar (1995), Heathcote and Perri (2002), Kehoe and Perri (2002), Iacoviello
and Minetti (2006), Bodenstein (2008), and Raffo (2008). These papers have ad-
dressed many international business cycle features: countercyclical trade balances,
cross-country correlations for consumption and output, terms of trade and real ex-
change rate fluctuations, etc. Some have assumed a complete market for financial
assets, while others have incorporated enforcement or borrowing constraints with the
result that actual defaults are ruled out at equilibrium. Using a non-state-contingent
bond, my model endogenously generates default in equilibrium. Hence, this paper is
closely associated with previous small-open economy default models. As explained
earlier, however, those models do not focus on default-related trade and real exchange
rate changes.
Another strand of literature also focuses on the connection between international
trade and defaults, but most of it is empirical studies. For instance, Rose (2005) docu-
ments that a default can reduce real bilateral trade value (in USD) by 8 percent for an
extended period after the event. However, it remains unclear why trade declines. The
four hypotheses of trade sanctions, trade credit collapse, asset seizures, and reputation
are commonly mentioned, but their empirical evidence remains ambiguous (Tomz and
Wright, 2013). This paper uses a theoretical model to examine the trade impact of
sovereign defaults through real exchange rate deterioration.
A few recent sovereign default papers (Cuadra and Sapriza, 2006; and Bleaney,
2008) have examined how exogenous exchange rate shocks can impact defaults in small
open economy models. The inclusion of endogenous exchange rates distinguishes this
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paper from them. Na, Schomitt-Grohe, Uribe, and Yue (2014) also includes endoge-
nous exchange rate but in nominal terms so that they can focus on optimal default
and exchange rate policy. Like this paper, their model achieves concurrent default and
depreciation. However, their nominal depreciation is driven by wage rigidity and gov-
ernment’s intention to reduce unemployment, whereas this paper’s real depreciation is
associated with changes to capital and trade flows.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model
environment and agents’ problems, defines a recursive equilibrium, and characterizes its
properties. Section 3 provides the model calibration and the results of the quantitative
analysis. Section 4 offers concluding remarks. Data sources are in the Appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
In this section, I study sovereign default, international goods trade, and the real ex-
change rate in a dynamic model of two risk-averse open economies: country 1 and
country 2. Each country produces a unique type of final goods. In particular, country
1’s firms allocate their capital to produce final goods 1 by pairing the capital either
with domestic labor, or with imported intermediate goods produced by country 2’s
labor (e.g., through vertical FDI and offshoring). Country 2 produces intermediate
goods using local workers. Therefore, the labor in country 2 either produces final
goods 2 together with domestic capital, or produces intermediate goods for country
1. Households in each country enjoy both final goods, which are imperfect substitutes
with constant elasticity. Governments in both countries are benevolent and maximize
their households’ lifetime utility.
On the bond market, a non-state-contingent one-period bond denominated in final
goods 1 is traded between country 1 and country 2, in one direction or the other. I
assume that only country 2 has propensity to default with different productivity state
realizations, while country 1 is always at steady state, and its bond is always safe.
Since it is the case in which country 2 issues risky bonds that is of interest, I will only
study the scenario in which country 2 is borrowing. The bond contracts reflect country
2’s default probabilities that are endogenous to its debt holding and its fundamental.
Hence, the equilibrium interest rate is linked to country 2’s default risk. Default can
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happen along the equilibrium because the asset structure is incomplete, as it does not
cover all the states that country 2 encounters. The risk-averse creditors in country 1
are willing to offer debt contracts that in some states may result in default by charging
a higher interest rate on these loans. The equilibrium interest rate is also associated
with the creditor’s risk aversion.
Once country 2 defaults, the event affects foreign firms’ activities related to the
defaulting country more than it affects domestic firms.6 In particular, the default
triggers an efficiency loss of foreign-firm-related intermediate goods production in the
defaulting country (e.g., due to crisis-elevated miscommunication between foreign firms
and intermediate goods sector), which results in a decline of intermediate goods exports
from the defaulting country to the creditor country. This story is consistent with
the data. For instance, the average annual growth rate of intermediate goods export
volume for the period of 1989-2013 for 15 countries (see data availability in Table 5 in
the Appendix), is 4.92 percent. However, during default episodes their average annual
growth rate is only 0.82 percent, suffering from a much larger decline in growth than
final goods exports, as shown in Table 1. This decline in intermediate goods exports
harms the production of those final goods 1 that involve such imported inputs from
country 2. Therefore, country 1’s firms reallocate capital away from combining with
the imported intermediate goods, but more towards its domestic labor to produce final
goods 1 without the imported intermediate goods.
Since there is no unemployment in this model, some workers in country 2 will then
shift from the intermediate goods sector to domestic production of final goods 2, en-
abling the country to export more of its own final goods. The reduced labor income
from the intermediate goods sector serves as part of country 2’s default costs. Mean-
while, when country 2 defaults on its sovereign bonds, both countries are temporarily
excluded from the international financial market for certain periods of time. There is
no other direct penalty, such as exogenous output loss or trade sanctions.7
I use the following notations throughout the rest of this paper. Ci stands for
6As mentioned in introduction, Brennan and Cao (1997), Tille and van Wincoop (2008), Milesi-
Ferretti and Tille (2010), and Broner, Didier, Erce, and Schmukler (2013) have provided evidence for
asymmetric crisis impacts on domestic and foreign agents due to crisis-elevated information asymme-
try and risk aversion. Moreover, Aizenman and Marion (2004) also documents that greater supply
uncertainty reduces the expected income from vertical FDI. Fuentes and Saravia (2010) find that a
default event can reduce FDI inflows by 72 percent.
7Trade sanctions after default lack of empirical support in the literature (Tomz and Wright, 2013).
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country i’s total consumption index. cij stands for country i’s consumption of final
goods j. ei stands for country i’s productivity, where e1 is constant and e2 follows
Markov chain. ε stands for the efficiency of foreign-firm-related intermediate goods
production in country 2. pj stands for final goods j’s price, and I normalize p1 = 1.
Therefore, p2 is terms of trade for country 2. I assume that the nominal exchange rate
between the two countries is 1, and thus p2 is also the real exchange rate. When p2
declines, it means the deterioration of the real terms of trade and the real exchange
rate for country 2. bi stands for country i’s assets. k¯1 stands for the total capital that
country 1’s firms have, a constant in this model. It is divided into that used with
domestic labor, k1, and that used with imported intermediate inputs, k
∗
1. n¯2 stands
for total labor in country 2, also a constant in this model. It is divided into those who
produce final goods 2, n2, and those who produce intermediate inputs for country 1,
n∗2. Country 1 also has constant domestic labor n¯1 that is used to produce final goods
1, and country 2 has constant domestic capital stock k¯2 that is used to produce final
goods 2.
2.2 Country 1
In the model, there are three types of agents in country 1: representative firms, house-
holds, and a government.
2.2.1 Firms
Firms hold country 1’s capital stock, k¯1, and allocate it between that used with domestic
labor, k1, and that used with imported intermediate inputs, k
∗
1, to produce final goods
1. The imported intermediate inputs are produced in country 2, using only local labor.
Country 1’s firms choose how many intermediate goods they need, and thus also how
many foreign workers to hire in the intermediate goods sector in country 2, n∗2. They
also pay wage w∗2 to the intermediate goods sector workers denominated in country
2’s local final goods 2. Here, I combine the decisions of imported intermediate inputs
and final goods 1 production to reflect the practice of vertical FDI and offshoring.8
The firms’ goal is to maximize profits in every period taking w∗2 and p2 as given. The
8This formulation is similar to those used in global sourcing literature where firms have a choice
to internalize its input supply, e.g., Antras and Helpman (2004).
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one-period profits of country 1’s firms are:
Π1 = max
n∗2,k
∗
1
{
e1(εe2n
∗
2)
α1k∗1−α11 − p2w∗2n∗2 + e1n¯α11 k1−α11
}
(1)
where k1 = k¯1 − k∗1. The first two terms are the total profit the firms gain from
using intermediate inputs produced by country 2’s labor, after deducting wage costs.
Notice that the production of final goods 1 using intermediate goods from country 2
uses the same technology as it uses to produce the same final goods 1 with domestic
labor. The intermediate goods production is a linear function of country 2’s workers
in this sector, n∗2, and is associated with country 2’s productivity e2. Importantly,
ε symbolizes the efficiency of foreign-firm-related intermediate goods production in
country 2. During normal times, ε = 1, meaning there is no efficiency loss compared
with country 2’s domestic goods sector. During default periods, ε = min( e¯2
e2
, 1), where
0 <  < 1 and e¯2 is country 2’s average productivity. This ε reflects asymmetric
crisis impacts on country 2’s domestic and foreign-related activities, e.g., due to crisis-
elevated information asymmetry (Brennan and Cao, 1997; Aizenman and Marion, 2004;
Tille and van Wincoop, 2008; Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2010; and Broner, Didier, Erce,
and Schmukler, 2013).
Firms’ capital allocation and foreign labor demand satisfy these optimality condi-
tions:
(k∗1) : e1(εe2n
∗
2)
α1(1− α1)k∗−α11 = e1n¯α11 (1− α1)(k¯1 − k∗1)−α1 (2)
(n∗2) : e1α1εe2(εe2n
∗
2)
α1−1k∗1−α11 = p2w
∗
2 (3)
2.2.2 Households and Government
Households in country 1 work at and own the firms. They use the proceeds for con-
sumption. They choose a consumption bundle to maximize a standard time-separable
utility function E[
∑∞
t=0 β
t
1U(C1t)], where 0 < β1 < 1 is the discount factor. C1t de-
notes country 1’s consumption bundle of final goods 1, c11, and final goods 2, c12.
More specifically, C1t = c
θ1
11tc
1−θ1
12t with two final goods being imperfect substitutes for
each other. I also assume that consumers purchase a relatively large share of domestic
goods, i.e., home bias, θ1 > 0.5. U(.) is the one-period utility function which is con-
tinuous, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and which satisfies the Inada conditions.
For the purpose of quantitative analysis, I define the utility function in the form of
11
U(C1t) =
C1−γ1t
1−γ with risk aversion parameter γ > 0.
Households also choose how many of the one-period non-state-contingent bonds is-
sued by country 2 to purchase, given the bond pricing function q(b′1, s), with s being the
aggregate state of the two economies. Alternatively, the households can borrow from
country 2 through its government transfers and will never default; the government’s
objective is to maximize households’ expected lifetime utility. The former case is the
one that is of interest and the focus of this model, because only country 2 has default
risks. So, I assign country 1 as the creditor. Since country 1 does not actively choose
whether it will default or not, its welfare depends on country 2’s default decisions.
When country 2 does not default, country 1’s optimization problem can be written
recursively as:
V1c(s, b1) = max
b′1,c11,c12
{
U(c11, c12) + β1[
∫
s′ /∈D(b′2)
V1c(s
′, b′1)dF (s
′|s) +
∫
s′∈D(b′2)
V1d(s
′)dF (s′|s)]
}
(4)
where D is the default set for country 2 that I will explain in the next section. The
problem is subject to:
Π1 + b1 = c11 + p2c12 + qb
′
1. (5)
where q(s′, b′1) = β1
∫
s′ /∈D(s′,b′2)
∂V ′1c/∂b
′
1dF (s
′|s)
λ1
, and λ1 is the multiplier of the budget con-
straint.
When country 2 defaults, both countries will have to undergo financial autarky for
a certain period of time.9 Country 1’s constrained maximization problem becomes:
V1d(s) = max
c11,c12
{U(c11, c12) + β1E[reV1x(s′, 0) + (1− re)V1d(s′)]} (6)
where V1x = [V1d(s, b1) or V1c(s)|country 2 defaults or not], and re is the probability of
both countries’ return to the bond market. The problem is subject to
Π1 = c11 + p2c12. (7)
9Some may argue that it is not realistic to also exclude the creditor from the international financial
market. But since country 1 has no productivity shock, its loss from the financial market exclusion is
minimal.
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Given the above setup, I calculate country 1’s GDP as the gross production of final
goods 1 minus the cost of imported intermediate goods. Notice that for country 1, its
GDP value and volume are the same in the model, because its goods price p1 = 1.
Hence, country 1’s GDP is defined to be equal to Π1.
2.3 Country 2
There are three types of agents in country 2: representative firms, households, and a
government.
2.3.1 Firms
Since country 2’s firms passively hire all the remaining workers that are not hired by
the intermediate goods sector, they maximize their profits according to the following
first order condition:
e2α2n
α2−1
2 k¯
1−α2
2 = w2 (8)
where w2 is domestic sector wage. It is worth noting that this model does not have
unemployment. However, it would be interesting to study sovereign default related
unemployment in this model in the future.
2.3.2 Households
Households in country 2 derive income from two sources: their wage income from
producing intermediate goods for country 1, and all the revenue of domestic firms
that are owned by the households. Country 2’s households choose a consumption
bundle to maximize a standard time-separable utility function E[
∑∞
t=0 β
t
2U(C2t)], where
0 < β2 < 1 is the discount factor, and C2t denotes the consumption bundle of final
goods 1, c21, and final goods 2, c22. Similar to the utility function for country 1’s
consumers, U(C2t) =
(c
θ2
21tc
1−θ2
22t )
1−γ
1−γ with θ2 < 0.5 for home bias and γ > 0 for risk
aversion.
Households take as given the wage income from the intermediate goods sector,
p2w
∗
2n
∗
2, the revenue from domestic firms, p2e2n
α2
2 k¯
1−α2
2 , and government transfers, T .
As in Mendoza and Yue (2012), households do not borrow directly from abroad, but
the government borrows, pays transfers to the households, and makes default decisions
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internalizing its citizens’ utility. Alternatively, households may invest directly in the
international financial market, but this case is not of interest here since country 1’s
bond is safe. The households’ optimization problem is:
max
c21t,c22t
E[
∞∑
t=0
βt2U(c21t, c22t)] (9)
subject to
p2te2tn
α2
2t k¯
1−α2
2 + p2tw
∗
2tn
∗
2t + Tt = c21t + p2tc22t. (10)
where n2t = n¯2 − n∗2t.
2.3.3 Government
The sovereign government issues one-period non-state-contingent discount bonds, so
the asset market is incomplete. The government cannot commit to repaying its debt.
It compares the value of repaying debt V2c and that of default V2d, and chooses the
option that gives a bigger value, that is:
V2x(s, b2) = max {V2c(s, b2), V2d(s)} (11)
The nondefault value is given by the choice of (b′2, c21, c22) that maximizes the fol-
lowing problem, where the government internalizes its citizens’ preferences for domestic
final goods 2 and imported final goods 1:
V2c(s, b2) = max
b′2,c21,c22
{U(c21, c22) + β2EV2x(s′, b′2)} (12)
subject to
p2e2n
α2
2 k¯
1−α2
2 + p2w
∗
2n
∗
2 + b2 = c21 + p2c22 + qb
′
2. (13)
where n2 = n¯2−n∗2 and q(s′, b′2) = β2
∫
s′ /∈D(s′,b′2)
∂V ′2c/∂b
′
2dF (s
′|s)
λ2
, and λ2 is the multiplier of
country 2’s budget constraint.
The definitions of the default set D and the probability of default are standard
from Eaton-Gersovitz type models (also see Arellano, 2008). Default set D at each
current debt level is a collection of exogenous states when country 2’s government will
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strategically choose to default to maximize its own value:
D(s, b2) = {s ∈ S : V2c(s, b2) < V2d(s)} (14)
Because no one is certain about the aggregate state tomorrow, the default proba-
bility pi2 is the sum of all the probabilities of tomorrow’s states where country 2 will
choose to default, given the current debt level. This default probability exists even if
country 2 does not consider the default risks when issuing bonds:
pi2(s, b
′
2) =
∫
s′∈D(s′,b′2)
f(s, s′)ds′ (15)
In the event of a default due to an adverse productivity shock to country 2, both
countries are temporarily excluded from the international bond market, and country 2
can not smooth its consumption by borrowing any more. Furthermore, the production
of intermediate goods in country 2 suffers from an efficiency loss due to a larger crisis
impact on foreign-firm-related activities than that on domestic activities (Brennan and
Cao, 1997; Aizenman and Marion, 2004; Tille and van Wincoop, 2008; Milesi-Ferretti
and Tille, 2010; and Broner, Didier, Erce, and Schmukler, 2013). Therefore, country
1’s firms shift capital towards pure domestic production; country 2’s workers get lower
income from the intermediate goods sector as part of default costs. Consequently,
country 2’s workers flow into the domestic sector, which encourages the production of
final goods 2. Nevertheless, due to the initial adverse productivity shock and income
loss from the intermediate goods sector, country 2’s overall income declines and its
consumers adjust their consumption portfolio according to home bias preferences. This
causes the country to import fewer and export more of final goods. Meanwhile, country
2’s terms of trade and real exchange rate deteriorate, further lowering its income and
magnifying the initial adverse productivity shock. Country 2’s default value is as
follows:
V2d(s) = max
c21,c22
{U(c21, c22) + β2E[reV2x(s′, 0) + (1− re)V2d(s′)]} (16)
subject to
p2e2n
α2
2 k¯
1−α2
2 + p2w
∗
2n
∗
2 = c21 + p2c22 (17)
where n2 = n¯2 − n∗2.
15
Given the above setup, I calculate country 2’s GDP as the gross production of final
goods 2 plus the intermediate goods exports. Hence, country 2’s GDP value is defined
as p2e2n
α2
2 k¯
1−α2
2 + p2w
∗
2n
∗
2, and its GDP volume is defined as e2n
α2
2 k¯
1−α2
2 + w
∗
2n
∗
2.
2.4 Equilibrium
Finally, in equilibrium all goods and financial markets clear for both countries in default
and nondefault regimes, and there is no wage difference between different sectors in
country 2:
e1(s)n¯
α1
1 (k¯1 − k∗1)1−α1 + e1(εe2n∗2)α1k∗1−α11 = c11 + c21 (18)
e2(s)(n¯2 − n∗2)α2 k¯1−α22 = c12 + c22 (19)
b1
′(s, b1) + b2′(s, b2) = 0 (20)
w∗2 = w2. (21)
Definition 1 A recursive competitive equilibrium is defined as a set of functions for
(a) country 1’s capital allocation and hiring decisions; (b) both countries’ households’
consumption policy c and saving policy b′; (c) welfare value V at default and repayment;
and (d) the law of motion for the aggregate states, such that: (i) the borrowing and
lending policies satisfy the problem’s first order conditions; (ii) the two countries’ value
functions satisfy Bellman Equations; (iii) p2 and q clear the goods and bond markets;
(iv) w∗2 and w2 stabilize labor flows between the two sectors in country 2; and (v) the
law of motion is consistent with the stochastic processes of e2.
Now I illustrate how bond prices are determined in this model. Let’s backpedal to a
simpler case where there is no default risk. Figure 2 plots bond price q against country
1’s asset level tomorrow b′1 (country 2’s borrowing tomorrow) for a given productivity
state s and current asset level of country 1 b1 (country 2 current borrowing). As shown
in the left panel, in the case of no default risk, the bond demand curve and bond supply
curve (dash lines) are close to linear and intersect at point E1.10 Point E1 pins down
the market equilibrium bond price and the next period’s quantity.
If the current bond holding is at a higher level, as in the right panel of Figure 2,
then country 1’s bond demand curve will shift up to the thicker dash line because of a
10Even in this risk-free bond case, the bond supply and demand curves are not exactly linear,
because of the agents’ risk aversion.
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Figure 2: Bond Price (given current b1)
Note: Here I assume productivity state s is constant. The x-axis in the above plots is b′1. As b
′
1 is
positive (right hand side) and becomes larger, country 2 borrows more and more.
lower current marginal utility of domestic consumption (i.e., λ1), and country 2’s bond
supply curve will shift down because of a higher current marginal utility of imported
consumption (i.e., λ2). This results in a new intersect point E1
′, which provides a larger
equilibrium bond quantity and a slightly lower price, depending on the two countries’
risk aversion.
Now let’s consider the default risks of bonds issued by country 2. In this case,
bond supply and demand curves take into account the borrower and the creditor’s
perspectives on default probability, respectively, as in the following equations:
q(b, b′, s) = β1
∫
s′ /∈D(s′,b′02 )
∂U
∂C′1
∂C′1
∂c′11
∂U
∂C1
∂C1
∂c11
dF (s′|s)
= β2
∫
s′ /∈D(s′,b′02 )
∂U
∂C′2
∂C′2
∂c′21
∂U
∂C2
∂C2
∂c21
dF (s′|s) (22)
The first equation represents the bond demand curve of country 1, and the second
equation is the bond supply curve of country 2. As default risk increases, both the
demand and supply curves imply lower bond prices, since both countries take into
account the default risk. That is to say, in the left panel of Figure 2, given current b1,
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both curves bend downward as tomorrow’s b′1 (i.e., country 2 tomorrow’s borrowing)
becomes larger, reflecting a higher default risk (solid lines).11 This results in a different
equilibrium point from the no-default-risk case, at E2: both the equilibrium bond
quantity and the price are lower than those at E1.
Again, if the current bond holding is at a higher level, as in the right panel of
Figure 2, then country 1’s bond demand curve will shift upward and country 2’s bond
supply curve will shift downward. The new intersect point E2′, again, provides a
larger equilibrium bond quantity and a lower price. However, due to the default risk,
the increase in the quantity is much smaller and the decrease in bond price is much
larger than the no-default-risk case.
Computationally, the inclusion of default risks in both bond supply and demand
functions poses a difficult challenge in solving this problem numerically. This is because
if both curves bend downward at similar levels of b′1 and when both of them reach where
q = 0, they create multiple equilibria. Therefore, in practice I solve the model with
country 1’s expectation about country 2’s default probability, but assume that country
2 itself is not concerned about its own default risk. Hence, country 1’s bond demand
curve is the solid bending curve, while country 2’s bond supply curve is the dash line
in Figure 2.
Theorem 1 Given a productivity shock to e2 and a pair of bond assets b
0
2 < b
1
2 ≤ 0,
if default is optional for b12, then default is also optimal for b
0
2 and the probability of
default at equilibrium satisfies pi2(s, b
0
2) ≥ pi2(s, b12).
Proof 1 Given a productivity shock to e2, the value of default V2d(s) is independent
of b2. The value function of repaying debt V2c(s, b2) is increasing in b2. There-
fore, if V2c(s, b
1
2) ≤ V2d(s), then it must be the case that V2c(s, b02) ≤ V2d(s) since
V2c(s, b
0
2) ≤ V2c(s, b12). Hence, for any s ∈ D(s, b12), we must also have s ∈ D(s, b02),
that is, D(s, b12) ⊆ D(s, b02). Therefore, by definition, we have pi2(s, b02) ≥ pi2(s, b12).
11At which levels of b′1 the supply and demand curves will bend down, however, may differ depending
on which country is more observant and/or more sensitive about the default risk. In Figure 2, I draw
that the bond demand curve starts to bend downward at a lower bond quantity level (b′1) than the
bond supply curve does. This implies that creditor country 1 is more aware and/or more sensitive
about default risks than the borrower country 2 is.
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3 Quantitative Results
3.1 Baseline Calibration
In this section, I study the quantitative implications of the model by conducting nu-
merical simulations at the quarterly frequency and using a baseline calibration based
largely on data for Mexico and Canada. Table 2 shows the calibrated parameter values.
Table 2: Parametrization
Calibrated Parameter Value Target Statistics
Risk aversion γ = 2 Standard RBC value
Financial market
re-entry probability re = 0.083 Dias and Richmond (2007)
Country 1 home goods
consumption share θ1 = 0.60 Canadian (CA) national accounts
Country 2 home goods
consumption share 1− θ2 = 0.70 Mexican (MX) national accounts
Country 1 domestic
production labor share α1 = 0.63 From OECD data for CA
Country 2 domestic
production labor share α2 = 0.45 From OECD data for MX
Intermediate goods share
in final goods 1 production α1 = 0.63 Same as country 1’s domestic labor share
Country 1 labor endowment n¯1 = 2.5 Average CA-to-MX employment ratio
Country 1 capital endowment k¯1 = 27.56 0.65, average FDI-to-GDP ratio for MX
Country 2 labor endowment n¯2 = 1 Normalized to 1
Country 2 capital endowment k¯2 = 1 Normalized to 1
Country 1 productivity e1 = 0.82 2, average CA-to-MX GDP ratio
Country 2 productivity steady state E(e2) = 1 Normalized to 1
Country 2 autocorrelation of TFP ρ = 0.4162 From production function
Country 2 std. dev. of TFP shocks σ = 0.0377 From production function
Country 1 discount factor β1 = 0.99 1%, US government bond interest rate
Parameter by Simulation Value Target Statistics
Country 2 discount factor β2 = 0.9655 1%, quarterly default frequency for MX
Intermediate goods sector
discount upon default  = 0.85 -0.09, average intm. goods export income
deviation from trend upon default for MX
The risk aversion parameter γ is set to 2, which is the standard value in quantitative
business cycle and sovereign default studies. The probability of reentering the inter-
national financial market after a default is 0.083, which implies that the country stays
in exclusion for an average of three years after default. This is the estimate obtained
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by Dias and Richmond (2007) for the median duration of exclusion periods. It is also
consistent with the finding by Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris (2011) and is applied by
Mendoza and Yue (2012).
The share of domestic products in final consumption for the two countries are
obtained from Canadian and Mexican national accounts and set to be 0.6 and 0.7,
respectively. They correspond to one minus the average ratio of goods and services
imports to final consumption expenditure calculated using annual data for the period
of 1981− 2012 from the World Bank (WDI).
The labor share in final production is set at 0.63 for Canada and 0.45 for Mexico,
which are the average labor income shares using annual data for the period of 1981-2009
(1981-2008 for Canada) from OECD Statistics. The share of the imported intermediate
goods in final goods production in Canada is the same as the labor share in final
production in Canada, since those intermediate goods are used to produce the same
Canadian final goods in the model, and the intermediate goods production is a function
of labor only.
I calibrate the sizes of the two countries assembling some regularities of Canada and
Mexico. The capital and labor endowments of country 2 are normalized to 1. Therefore,
country 1’s labor size is n¯1 = 2.5 to match the average CA-to-Mexico employment ratio
for 1981Q1-2012Q4. Country 1’s capital endowment is chosen such that at steady
state country 1’s capital used with intermediate goods is 65 percent of country 2’s
GDP, which is approximated by the average of FDI-to-GDP ratio for Mexico during
1981Q1-2012Q4 assuming the majority of the FDI to Mexico is vertical. However, it is
important to note that this approximated target is by no means a complete calibration
for the actual amount of foreign capital used, along with intermediate goods from
Mexico to produce foreign final goods.
At this stage, the only productivity shock in the model is to country 2’s productivity
e2. The steady state of e2 is normalized to 1. Therefore, the constant productivity of
country 1, e1, is calibrated to be 0.8247, so that at steady state the CA-to-Mexico GDP
ratio is 2, the same as the average CA-to-Mexico GDP ratio for 1981− 2011 according
to annual data from IMF. I model the productivity of country 2 as an AR(1) process:
log e2,t = ρ log e2,t−1 + t
with  being iid and followingN(0, σ2). I estimate the process using the model’s produc-
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tion functions, the HP-filtered data of GDP, (average) capital stock, and employment
at both domestic sector and FDI sector for 1981Q1-2012Q4 in Mexico. Using Tauchen
and Hussey (1991), I further construct a Markov approximation to this process with 5
states of productivity realization for e2.
The targets for setting β1, β2, and  are, respectively, the risk free interest rate
from US or Canadian treasury bills, quarterly frequency of Mexico defaults, and the
loss in intermediate goods exports upon default. Both US and Canadian treasury
bills bear interest rates that are lower than 1 percent, hence, we have β1 = 0.99.
Mexico’s quarterly default frequency is about 1%, since it had eight default episodes
between 1828 and 2012 according to Reinhart (2010).12 Moreover, I include more
default incidents in order to study the dynamics around those events in later sections.
I distinguish three separate default occurrences drawn from Paris Club data for this
paper’s sample period 1981Q1-2012Q4, even though Reinhart (2010) counts them as
one. They are 1982Q3, 1986Q1, and 1989Q1. Upon these three most recent onsets
of sovereign default, Mexico’s intermediate goods export value, on average, was about
9 percent below trend. Given these two targets, the simulated procedure yields β2 =
0.9655 and  = 0.85.
I solve the model with a discretized state space of 5 realizations for country 2’s
productivity and 107 points for asset holdings. The model is considered as solved
when the convergence distance diminishes to 1.0000e− 06. In the following sections, I
first examine the properties of the calibrated model, then study the simulated results
both along business cycles and around default events.
3.2 Policy Functions
The properties of bond quantity and its price in this model are in line with existing
papers. Figure 3 left plot graphs the next period assets for country 2 against its current
assets, at a high productivity state and a low productivity state in the current period.
As country 2 borrows more and more (to the left of the bottom axis), its marginal
borrowing capacity diminishes. Moreover, when the country is at a low state, its bond
function starts to flatten out at a lower current debt amount than if it were at a high
state.
Figure 3 right plot graphs the bond price functions. It shows that the bond price
12The average default frequency is 4 percent annually, or 1 percent quarterly.
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Figure 3: Policy Functions
decreases with debt level (i.e., the interest rate rises). Across productivity states, the
bond price is significantly higher for a high state, which implies countercyclical interest
rates.
3.3 Cyclical Movements in the Baseline Model
This section starts the assessment of the quantitative performance of the model by
comparing moments from the data with moments from the model’s dynamics. To
compute the latter, I feed the TFP process into the model and conduct 1000 simula-
tions, each with 600 periods. Then I truncate the first 100 observations and use the
rest to compute the statistics of this model’s results.
Table 3 compares the moments produced by the baseline model with those from
Mexico data and Mendoza and Yue (MY, 2012). Notice that Mendoza and Yue (2012)
calibrate their model partially to Argentine data and partially to Mexican data. All
the data used in this model are quarterly from 1981Q1 to 2012Q4. The data sources
are provided in the Appendix. First, this model produces a debt-to-GDP ratio of more
than 11 percent on average while at the same time matching the 1 percent default
frequency observed in the data. Because the time discount factor of country 2 is
lower than that of country 1 in calibration, the difference in consumption patience can
support a certain level of debt. However, this model’s debt-to-GDP ratio is lower than
that in Mendoza and Yue (2012). Their paper adopts a lower default frequency and
a lower time discount factor (β = 0.88) that allow their model to produce a higher
22
Table 3: Statistical Moments of Country 2’s Business Cycles
Variable Data Baseline MY (2012)
Average debt/GDP ratio (in percent) 74.94 11.73 22.88
Average bond spreads (in percent) 4.35 4.51 0.74
Bond spreads std. dev. (in percent) 4.71 3.83 1.23
Real exchange rate std. dev. 0.17 0.07 n.a.
Domestic product consumption std. dev./GDP std. dev. 1.23 0.73 n.a.
Total consumption std. dev./GDP std. dev. 1.12 0.98 1.05
Trade balances excl. intm goods exp/GDP std. dev. in percent 2.01 1.71 n.a.
Final goods export std. dev./GDP std. dev. 0.82 0.12 n.a.
Intm. goods export std. dev./GDP std. dev. 1.02 0.42 n.a.
Total import std. dev./GDP std. dev. 1.13 0.31 n.a.
Correlation with GDP
Bond spreads −0.39 −0.67 −0.17
Real exchange rate 0.53 0.37 n.a.
Trade balances excl. intm goods exp/GDP −0.65 −0.61 −0.54
Total exports 0.21 0.84 n.a.
Intermediate goods exports 0.18 0.80 n.a.
Total import 0.75 0.82 n.a.
GDP volume 0.65 0.80 n.a.
Default occurrence −0.14 −0.25 −0.09
Default duration −0.39 −0.60 n.a.
Correlation with bond spreads
Real exchange rate −0.76 −0.86 n.a.
Trade balances excl. intm goods exp/GDP 0.30 0.37 0.15
Total exports −0.02 −0.59 n.a.
Intermediate goods exports −0.08 −0.67 n.a.
Total import −0.28 −0.86 n.a.
GDP volume −0.19 −0.16 n.a.
Default occurrence 0.18 0.29 n.a.
Default duration 0.56 0.94 n.a.
Note: Except bond spreads, the real exchange rate, default occurrence and duration, and the averages,
all other data in the table are HP-filtered. Trade balances are calculated as ratios to GDP.
All data are in real terms and at quarterly frequency.
debt-to-GDP ratio.
Moreover, unlike Mendoza and Yue (2012) and many other sovereign default models,
this paper incorporates creditors’ risk aversion. As default risks mount, creditors’ risk
aversion can potentially cause bond prices to decrease faster and suppress country 2’s
debt level more severely than in a model with risk neutral creditors. This also implies
that country 2 needs to pay a higher interest rate, which in turn further increases its
default probability. Hence, creditors’ risk aversion limits the model’s ability to generate
data-matching debt-to-GDP ratios, which is another reason that this model generates
a lower debt-to-GDP ratio than Mendoza and Yue (2012). However, risk aversion does
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help my model support a higher average bond spread, which is more consistent with
the data than existing literature. I will elaborate on this point below.
The sustainable debt level in the model also depends on the costs of default. As
the default costs get larger as a percentage of GDP, country 2 becomes less likely to
default, and thus can sustain a higher debt level. The costs of default to the borrower
in the model include exclusion from the financial market, and endogenous income losses
from the intermediate goods sector and the real depreciation. The effect of income loss
from intermediate goods exports on debt level is restricted by the magnitude of the
income loss, consumers’ preferences with respect to home goods and imports, and their
impacts on the real exchange rate. Additionally, the income loss from intermediate
goods exports increases with country 2’s productivity state. Hence, country 2 has a
larger incentive to default at a lower state.
The mean and variance of bond spreads are close to the data. Notice that the bond
price reflects not only the expected return due to the probability of default, but also
compensation to the risk-averse creditors for bearing consumption risk. Therefore,
unlike previous papers with risk-neutral investors, the risk aversion of investors in
country 1 in this model break the close link between the probability of default and
bond pricing. This enables the result to be consistent with the data, where the average
bond spread is several times higher than historical default frequency.
The volatility of real exchange rates, domestic consumption, and total consumption
are smaller in the model than in the data. Real exchange rate fluctuation upon default
is greatly influenced by the home bias preference of consumption in the model (see
Sensitivity Analysis section). In the model, when a large share of a country’s utility
depends on its consumption of foreign goods, it is optimal for the country not to
reduce imports too much when income is low and to have a stable real exchange rate.
However, in reality many other trade and monetary policies can affect the fluctuations
of real exchange rates along business cycles, and these are not taken into account by this
model. Domestic consumption is much smoother in the model than in the data because
of borrowing, home bias preference, and labor movement from the intermediate goods
sector to the domestic sector in default crises. These three factors support domestic
goods production and their consumption in spite of adverse productivity shocks. Total
consumption is less smoothed than the domestic counterpart in the model on account
of the variations in imports and real exchange rate deterioration during default.
In terms of the volatility of trade balances, imports, and exports, the model results
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are also lower than those of the data. Other sovereign default models have generated
similar results for trade balances, for example, Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) produces
trade balance standard deviation to be 0.95, Arellano (2008) 1.5, and Yue (2010) 2.81.
But the difference here is that the trade balances in this paper are not residuals of
output from consumption. Instead, they are the combined result of capital flows and
consumers’ home bias and risk aversion. Moreover, this model is distinguished from
previous default models in separating exports and imports. In both the data and
the model, final goods exports are less volatile than imports and intermediate goods
exports.
Next, Table 3 shows that this model does a good job of delivering the correlation
between GDP and bond spreads, as well as their correlations with other variables. The
model yields a negative correlation between bond spreads and GDP, consistent with
the data, because the bond bears higher default risk in bad states. As in Mendoza and
Yue (2012), this model produces countercyclical default risk in a setting where both
output and default risks are endogenous and affect each other, unlike in the models of
sovereign default alone or of business cycles alone.
However, this model distinguishes itself from Mendoza and Yue (2012) in that the
endogenous output and default risks affect each other mainly through the deterioration
of the real exchange rate. In my model, the real exchange rate has a positive relation
with GDP and a strong negative relation with bond spreads, which is consistent with
the data. As country 2 borrows more and more, the bond interest rate rises, resulting
in a tighter budget constraint with more and more funds flowing out of country 2 into
country 1. Therefore, due to the home bias preference, country 2 consumers adjust
their consumption portfolio to reduce imports, and the real exchange rate is under
pressure to fall. This prevents real appreciation from helping the country to pay back
debt that is denominated in country 1’s final goods, and also from easing the budget
constraint.
Once country 2 defaults due to an adverse productivity shock, it is penalized by
exclusion from the financial market and another endogenous income loss from the
intermediate goods sector that is additional to the income loss from the initial adverse
productivity shock. As country 2’s budget constraint further tightens, its consumption
portfolio is once again adjusted away from imports and its final goods exports rise.
Consequently, the trade balances become more positive than before, while the real
exchange rate drops sharply.
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This mechanism, in which increased borrowing and default risk raise the real interest
rate and exports, and decrease income and imports, explains why this model generates a
negative relation between trade balances and GDP, while producing a positive relation
between trade balances and bond spreads. This is consistent with the Mexican data.
It is also in line with the stylized fact of other developing countries’ business cycles
and previous models of sovereign default. For instance, Mendoza and Yue (2012) uses
annual Argentine data for 1980-2005, and show that its trade balances’ correlations
with GDP and bond spreads are -0.87 and 0.82, respectively. Their model generates
the trade balances’ correlations with GDP and bond spreads to be -0.54 and 0.15,
respectively. Moreover, consistently with the data, this model also delivers procyclical
bilateral trade flows and a negative relation between bilateral trade flows and bond
spreads that have not been captured by previous papers.
Furthermore, the model predicts the correlations between country 1’s use of in-
termediate goods from country 2 and both GDP and bond spreads, qualitatively in
line with the correlations observed in Mexican data. More broadly, the business cycle
correlations between output and intermediate goods export value vary across countries
but are usually positive. For instance, using annual growth data (1988-2013), I com-
pute the correlation for 17 countries, for which I have intermediate goods exports data.
On average, their correlation between output growth and intermediate goods exports
growth is 40 percent.13
Additionally, with the real exchange rate in this model, I can disentangle the
default-related losses in GDP value and GDP volume. As I show in the next sec-
tion, during default periods, about one third of GDP value loss is due to GDP volume
declines, while the other two thirds are attributed to real depreciation. In Table 3,
even though GDP value is positively correlated to GDP volume, it is not a perfect
correlation–only 65 percent in the data and 80 percent in the model. The real ex-
change rate does play a role in GDP value variations in both the model and the data.
Also, consistently with the data, the model generates declining production activities
when bond spreads increase along business cycles.
Lastly, I report in Table 3 the correlations between default and output, and between
default and bond spreads. In particular, the onset of a default event is positively
13The correlation for Argentina is 34.8%, Brazil 66.4%, Croatia 13.1%, Ecuador 5.2%, Greece 17.1%,
Iceland 41.8%, Indonesia 24.4%, Moldova 26.2%, Peru 52.6%, Russia 66.1%, South Africa 56.4%, Spain
36.3%, Thailand 55.5%, Turkey 7.2%, Ukraine 81.8%, Uruguay 58.5%, and Venezuela 43.3%.
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correlated with output and negatively correlated with bond spreads in both the data
and the model. As for the duration of a default episode, it is more closely related to
bond spreads than to output in the model, which is also the case in the data.
3.4 Dynamics around Default Events
Next I study the model’s macroeconomic, trade, and welfare dynamics around default
events by comparing the simulated results with the time series data for Mexico. This
paper identifies three sovereign default occurrences by Mexico since 1981, in 1982Q3,
1986Q1, and 1989Q1. Those dates are inferred from Paris Club data, which shows that
Mexico was treated on 1983 June 22nd, 1986 September 17th, and 1989 May 30th by
foreign creditors for its sovereign debts. Each episode window covers 6 quarters before
and after a default onset. Date 0 is the quarter of default occurrences. I plot the mean
of these three default episodes for each of the variables from the data, as well as the
mean from the model simulation surrounded by a one-standard-deviation band.14
3.4.1 Macroeconomic Dynamics
Figure 4 shows the model’s macroeconomic dynamic results, i.e., deviations from steady
state (or trend in the data). The model’s V-shaped GDP value dynamics are quali-
tatively consistent with the data for Mexico, although the model generates a deeper
drop. In the model, the decline of output upon default comes from two sources: GDP
volume decrease and real exchange rate deterioration. On average, the lasting exchange
rate deterioration after a default in the model matches well with the data, about 15
percent. However, Mexico’s GDP volume (seasonally adjusted) does not seem affected
much by the default events, whereas in the model GDP volume decreases by almost 10
percent on average, less than the decline of the real exchange rate. Overall, the GDP
loss upon default is mostly driven by the lower real exchange rate in the model, and
even more so in Mexico data.15
On the sovereign debt market, this model predicts that the debt-to-GDP ratio is
relatively stable over the four quarters prior to a default, then surges as it approaches
14This section uses the same simulation results as in the previous section.
15It is worth noting the fact that little GDP volume declines around the default episodes for Mexico
is not uncommon for other countries. The changes to GDP volume growth upon a default are diverse
across countries. For instance, Paraguay grew by 4.32 percent in GDP volume during its 2003 default,
while Indonesia’s GDP volume declined by 13.13 percent during 2008 default.
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Figure 4: Macroeconomic Dynamics around Default Events
Note: Default events are identified as 1982Q3, 1986Q1, and 1989Q1. Except for the interest rate and
debt-to-GDP ratio, all other data are HP-filtered. GDP value, GDP volume, domestic sector labor,
hours worked, and intermediate goods export sector (FDI) labor are logged before being detrended.
For the subplots with a different scale on the right axis, the scale is for the data of the variable.
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and reaches the default, and drops afterwards. To make the model’s debt ratio com-
parable to the data, I follow Mendoza and Yue (2012) and adjust the mean of the
post-default debt ratios from the model to be the average of the pre-default debt ratio
and the debt ratio chosen once the country reenters the international financial market.
However, the post-default debt ratio in the model still declines faster than in the data.
Also, the model’s debt ratio is significantly lower than the data’s. This is an issue
that is common to the previous strategic sovereign default models. It can be partially
attributed to creditors’ risk aversion, as analyzed in the previous section.
Moreover, the model does well in creating the qualitative features of the increase
in the real interest rate around default events. I do not show the model interest rate
at the default quarter because it does not exist due to exclusion from the financial
market. The model is able to support high interest rates and bond spreads prior to
a default, due to creditors’ risk aversion. Here the interest rates not only incorporate
the default risk, but also compensates the creditor country for its risk aversion.
In addition, the model matches the intermediate goods exports (through vertical
FDI and offshoring) sector employment especially well, in both its decline and recovery,
consistent with the finding of Bergin, Feenstra, and Hanson (2009, 2011).16 But the
model does not match the domestic sector employment very well. This is mainly
because the model does not include unemployment. More specifically, country 2’s
domestic production sector has to take whatever amount of labor remains after the
intermediate goods sector’s employment. If this limitation were eliminated, the model
could potentially have another labor market channel affecting the costs of default for
country 2, as in Mendoza and Yue (2012). However, if we look at total hours worked
(the dotted line), it did not decline as much as employment upon default and matches
better with the model result.17 Overall, I simplify the labor market in this paper to
highlight the real exchange rate channel and international trade results. Nevertheless,
adding more labor market dynamics to this model would be of interest for future
research.
16Bergin, Feenstra, and Hanson (2009, 2011), using Mexico’s maquiladora sectors, find that the
country’s offshoring industries experience employment fluctuations that are much more volatile than
those in the U.S.
17Notice that due to data limitation, here total hours worked data is for manufacturing sector and
is not necessarily for domestic production only.
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3.4.2 Trade Dynamics
I now analyze the model’s performance in variables related to international trade in
Figure 5 and Figure 6. Before going into detail in Figure 5, one thing to notice from
the data is that there are significant fluctuations in the measures of exports around
t = −4. This is due to the rise of Mexico’s real exchange rate from mid-1980 to early
1982, as shown in Figure 4’s real exchange rate data. It is not a consequence of default
and is exogenous to the components of this model. Disregarding this irregularity in
the data, the model captures the qualitative features of different measures of exports
in the data, as shown in Figure 5.
In particular, total export value declines slightly, even though export volume and
export share of GDP rise on average. The main cause of this difference is real exchange
rate deterioration upon default. I then separate the total exports data into intermediate
goods and final goods, as in the model. Since there is no intermediate goods and final
goods export volume data available for Mexico, I use intermediate goods and final
goods exports in peso (logged) to approximate the volumes. For final goods exports,
the model matches the post-default rising value, volume, and share of GDP, although
it fails to capture the initial declines of their value that are due to real exchange rate
declines upon default.
For the intermediate goods exports, their value, volume, and percentage of GDP
all decline in the model as in the data, even though the volume and the percentage
of GDP declines are slight and they recovered faster in the data than in the model
after the defaults. It is worth noting that declines of intermediate goods exports are
not uncommon for other developing countries’ default episodes. As shown in Table 1,
on average during default periods, its average annual growth rate is -1.11 percent. A
similar picture is true for the growth rates of intermediate goods export volume (0.82
percent) and its share of GDP (-1.92 percent).
Figure 6 plots the dynamics for imports and trade balances (including intermediate
goods exports). The model does well in matching the qualitative patterns of imports
upon default. It succeeds especially in being in line with the data of import-to-GDP
ratio, given that most of the data path is within the error band of the model result.
Adding import value and export value together, bilateral trade value is more than 8
percent below trend upon default, which is consistent with the finding of Rose (2005).
Lastly and importantly, the rise in the trade balances when a default occurs is a
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Figure 5: Export Dynamics around Default Events
Note: Default events are identified as 1982Q3, 1986Q1, and 1989Q1. All data are real and HP-filtered.
Export value (in USD), export volume, and final goods exports are logged before being detrended.
For the subplots with a different scale on the right axis, the scale is for the data of the variable.
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Figure 6: Trade Dynamics around Default Events
Note: Default events are identified as 1982Q3, 1986Q1, and 1989Q1. All data are HP-filtered. Import
value and volume are logged before being detrended. For the subplots with a different scale on the
right axis, the scale is for the data of the variable.
result of a larger increase in the export-to-GDP ratio than the increase in the import-
to-GDP ratio, in both the data and the model. In previous default models, during the
default period the defaulting country usually registers a zero trade balance, because it
is excluded from the international financial market for at least one period, and thus
there is no capital flow to finance the trade imbalance. In this respect, Mendoza and
Yue (2012) is an exception. It introduces default-triggered exogenous capital flows that
are independent of the borrowing and the default decisions, to support the surge of
trade balances upon default in their model. This paper differs in that no exogenous
element is needed. Here, the trade balances are naturally generated by the trading of
two final goods for consumption and intermediate goods for production.
3.4.3 Welfare Dynamics
Since this paper uses a two-country model, I am able to study the welfare of both
creditor and borrower (Figure 7). For the creditor country, on average a default triggers
a 15 percent surge in welfare; this gain remains positive and withers slowly back to zero
during the next 12 quarters and beyond. It is not surprising to see a welfare gain as
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Figure 7: Welfare around Default Events
Note: Default events are identified as 1982Q3, 1986Q1, and 1989Q1.
a default approaches, because the creditor country harvests higher interest rates. But
the slow decay of this extra gain after a default is less obvious. This happens mainly
because after a default, the borrower’s real exchange rate remains low. Therefore, the
creditor country is still able to enjoy inexpensive imports. However, we should interpret
this result of welfare gain for the creditor country and the magnitude of the gain with
caution. This paper aims to point out that it is worth considering the real exchange
channel, through which a creditor country can experience gains from another country’s
sovereign default. Meanwhile, we should also acknowledge that in practice the impact
of a sovereign default to a creditor country’s welfare depends on many other factors.
For instance, it hinges on the substitutability between imports from the defaulting
country and other goods for consumption and production in the creditor country.18
For the borrower country, a default delivers, on average, a 30 percent drop in
welfare. However, this loss can be recovered in fewer than 12 quarters, as the country
restores its productivity and reenters the international financial market. The welfare
pattern before and after a default is more symmetric than it is for the creditor country.
Additionally, in the model the world welfare worsens upon default, since the creditor’s
gain is smaller than the borrower’s loss. But the world is able to recover and register
18
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a net gain within 12 quarters.
3.5 Results for the Sample Period
The model can also replicate the time series of Mexico output and bond spreads for
the sample period of 1981Q1-2012Q4. I feed the corresponding productivity shocks
into the model and compare the results with the data. Figure 8 plots the HP-filtered
output value and volume, along with the simulated results. The model matches the
data well in terms of the two output measures. The grey areas in the figures show the
model-predicted default occurrences in 1986Q1 and 1995Q3. Even though 1995Q3 is
not officially documented as a sovereign default, Mexico would have defaulted following
its 1994 crisis without the aid it received from foreign countries (mainly the US).
Figure 9 plots the bond spreads. The model matches the bond spreads data well
for the period of 1986Q1-2001Q4, and less so for the periods before and after. In
particular, the model underestimates the interest rate spreads for 1982Q1-1985Q4.
The main reason for this is that the productivity shocks fed into the model show a big
spike for the output boom in Mexico right before 1985.19 Overall, the model results
indicate that Mexico faces countercyclical bond spreads, and it defaults on sovereign
debts when the output is low and the interest rate is high.
3.6 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section I conduct a sensitivity analysis to evaluate the robustness of the model’s
quantitative results regarding the real exchange rate, bond spreads, and trade flows.
The model results are robust to changes in data filter, country 2’s shock persistence
(ρ2), patience (β2), consumption preference to imports (θ2), and post-default efficiency
loss in intermediate goods exports (). The results are summarized in Table 4.20 This
table shows the main business cycle statistical moments as in Table 3 for each alterna-
tive scenario, plus default frequency and several around-default values for variables of
interest.
19The spike appears using HP filter or BP filter.
20I also generated around-default dynamics plots comparable to Figure 4, 5, and 6. The quantitative
differences are small and qualitative patterns are the same, so I do not put them in the paper due to
space limitation. But several around-default values for variables of interest are reported in Table 4.
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Figure 8: Mexico Output in the Data and in the Model (1981Q1-2012Q4)
Note: All Mexican data are HP-filtered.
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Figure 9: Mexico Bond Spreads in the Data and in the Model (1981Q1-2012Q4)
3.6.1 BP Filter
In the first scenario, I re-calibrate the entire model with BP-filtered data. BP filter may
extract the desired frequency from the quarterly data more precisely than HP filter. In
fact, in this case BP filter generates a much higher persistence of productivity shock
for Mexico (0.8876) than the baseline using HP filter (0.4162), and a lower volatility
(0.0143) than the baseline (0.0377). Again, to calibrate the model’s default frequency
so that it is consistent with the data (0.01), I adjust β2 to 0.9797 (baseline is 0.9655).
The results are close to the baseline and qualitatively robust to different filters. Yet
three differences stand out. First, the average debt-to-GDP ratio and the volatility of
total consumption are higher than those of the baseline, becoming more consistent with
the data. Second, the variation of bond spreads declines. Third, the defaulter registers
a larger welfare loss upon default than baseline. However, switching the filter makes it
difficult to disentangle the causes for those changes, because multiple parameters have
been changed at the same time (i.e., the entire model is re-calibrated). The following
scenarios have only one parameter’s value changed at a time.
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3.6.2 Shock Persistence
The next two columns of Table 4 report the results for shocks with lower persistence
(ρ = 0.2) and higher persistence (ρ = 0.6) than the baseline (ρ = 0.4162). Comparing
the three scenarios, I find that most variables have small changes that are monotonic
with the change of shock persistence. Some more significant changes occur to the
average debt-to-GDP ratio, the correlations of GDP value and bond spreads with
trade balances and GDP volume, and the defaulter’s and the world’s welfare losses.
First, lower shock persistence allows a country to get back on track faster after
an adverse productivity shock and thus to maintain a higher average debt level. Sec-
ond, lower shock persistence also generates lower and short-lived output and income
declines on average. So although home bias preference will shift consumers towards
domestic goods during downturns, imports do not have to decline as much as in base-
line. Therefore, both imports and trade balances become less correlated with GDP
and bond spreads. Third, these conditions also lead to a smaller welfare loss for the
defaulting country, as well as the world. These changes are reversed in the case of
higher shock persistence.
3.6.3 Patience
The discount factor β2 = 0.9655 in the baseline is much higher than the value com-
monly used in the sovereign default literature (e.g., the discount factor in Aguiar and
Gopinath 2006, Arellano 2008, Yue 2010, and Mendoza and Yue 2012 are all below
0.953). However, it is lower than the typical value in real business cycle literature.
Here I conduct some analysis to see how the results vary with the value of the discount
factor. A lower discount factor of 0.9255 and a higher one of 0.9755 are used to compare
the results with the baseline’s 0.9655. All the variables change monotonically with the
discount factor.
Intuitively, less care about the future brings more frequent defaults, a lower average
debt-to-GDP ratio, and a higher average bond spread. Meanwhile, less patience also
generates more volatility in total consumption and trade, moving the model results
closer to the data. The resulting real exchange rates and trade balances also fluctuate
more in correlation with GDP and bond spreads. However, the borrower’s post-default
welfare loss is significantly smaller than that in the baseline. The main reason is that
the borrower is not as concerned as in the baseline about their losses in the near future
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due to default.
3.6.4 Consumer Preference to Imports
The next two columns in Table 4 report the model results with a lower consumer
preference towards imports (θ2 = 0.2) and a higher imports preference (θ2 = 0.4) than
that of the baseline (θ2 = 0.3). Hypothetically, with a higher preference for imports,
the borrower would become more concerned about its imported consumption once it
defaults, leading it to default less frequently. However, its impact on default reduction
is little according to the model result. Even though a higher imports preference changes
little about the frequency of defaults, it does allow the borrower to sustain a higher
average debt-to-GDP ratio.
Moreover, with a higher consumption preference for imports, it is optimal for the
country to maintain lower real exchange volatility, and thus the real exchange rate’s
correlations with GDP and bond spreads both decline. Upon default, the real exchange
rate’s drop (-0.05) is about half of that in the baseline (-0.11). In terms of welfare,
being more open to imports does expose the borrower to more welfare losses during a
sovereign default crisis.
Worldwide, welfare also declines upon default, but the decline is much larger in the
case of a higher imports preference of the borrower, because of a larger decline in the
defaulting country’s welfare and a smaller gain by the creditor country. Here, creditor
country’s smaller gain is due to limited real exchange rate change upon default. This
result does not necessarily imply that increasing trade openness causes more damage
to the world during a default crisis. For instance, if the model allows the creditor
country to raise its appetite for the borrower’s imports at the same time, the creditor
would be able to harvest more gains from a sovereign default event through increased
imports from the defaulter. World welfare would not decrease as much upon default
in a bilaterally-integrated world as it would in a unilaterally-integrated world.
One result that is qualitatively different from the baseline is that when the imports
are desired less (θ2 = 0.2, stronger home bias), the business cycle correlation between
trade balances and bond spreads turns slightly negative. Two effects play a role in
this change. First, even though trade balances still rise upon default, these increases
are weakened because of weaker increases of final goods exports as a GDP ratio given
the stronger home bias. Second, when the borrower country has not defaulted yet,
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its bond spreads rise, and its budget constraint is tightened, the country will decrease
some of its imports and even more of its exports as ratios to GDP to satisfy the strong
preference for domestic goods. Despite the slight negative correlation between trade
balances and bond spreads, it is worth noting that the correlations of GDP with trade
balances and bond spreads are still negative and consistent with data.
3.6.5 Post-default Efficiency Loss in Intermediate Goods Exports
Finally, I report results with a lower value of  = 0.82 (i.e., a greater efficiency loss
of intermediate goods exports upon default) and a higher  = 0.88 than that in the
baseline  = 0.85. It is important to experiment with different values of  because it
governs the magnitude of post-default losses in the defaulter’s intermediate goods ex-
ports, and thus also the post-default tightness of its budget constraint, and its changes
in real exchange rates and trade flows. Even though the results change slightly under
different values of , the signs of all the statistics remain consistent with the data across
the two scenarios.
With a lower value of  = 0.82, the borrower suffers from a larger loss upon default,
which induces two main effects. First, it helps the borrower to maintain a higher level
of average debt-to-GDP ratio.21 Second, together with home bias preference, the larger
loss and tighter budget make the borrower’s trade flows and real exchange rates more
responsive to a default crisis. Hence, the model delivers a larger real depreciation of 14
percent upon default. Meanwhile, the volatility of the real exchange rates and trade
balances are slightly higher, and their correlations with GDP and bond spreads are
also higher.
As for welfare, it is clear that under a lower value of  = 0.82, the defaulter registers
a larger loss, while the creditor gains more through favorable exchange rate movements
and trade than in the baseline. In terms of world welfare, this model predicts that,
other conditions being equal, a higher default penalty achieved by reducing the use
of intermediate goods from the defaulting country can help reduce the loss of world
welfare. This is because of a larger welfare transfer from the borrower to the creditor
through more severe real depreciation.
Summing up, this sensitivity analysis shows that although the model’s statistical
moments vary somewhat as I change key parameters, the main quantitative and qual-
21Default frequency also declines but by very little, beyond the digit shown in the table.
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itative findings are robust to these changes. The model produces a sharp decline in
the real exchange rate upon default, a high average bond spread, a negative correla-
tion between trade balances and GDP, and other data-consistent correlations between
various trade flows and GDP or bond spreads.
4 Conclusion
This paper proposes a two-country open-economy model of sovereign default, including
both production and risk-averse agents. Its quantitative predictions are in general
consistent with observed empirical regularities around emerging markets’ sovereign
defaults and along their business cycles. The model contributes to the literature with
its endogenous trade balance reversal upon default, as well as its inclusion of imports
and exports, the real exchange rate, and creditor welfare analysis.
The model features a real exchange rate amplification channel that links default
with trade and income. As a country borrows more and more, its default risk increases,
the interest rate rises, and the budget constraint tightens. Then, due to home bias
consumption preference, the country adjusts its consumption portfolio by reducing
imports. Now, with reduced imports, the real exchange rate is subject to downward
pressure, and does not increase enough, if at all, to help the borrower pay back debt
and ease its budget constraint.
Once the borrower does default due to an adverse productivity shock, an imposed
financial autarky for a random period of time and a decline of intermediate goods
exports from the defaulter to the creditor trigger another income loss additional to
that by the initial adverse productivity shock in the defaulting country. The further
tightened budget constraint induces another even bigger decline in imports, and thus a
sharp deterioration of the real exchange rate. This real depreciation then contributes
to a third income loss of the defaulter and to trade balance reversal. The real exchange
rate channel produces a novel feedback loop among the borrower’s default, income, and
trade.
The model results are consistent with three important stylized facts about emerg-
ing markets’ business cycles and sovereign defaults. First, the model delivers coun-
tercyclical trade balances and procyclical trade flows over business cycles. Second,
it produces countercyclical bond spreads with a data-consistent average. Third, this
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model accounts for sharp real depreciation, trade balance improvements, and bilateral
trade declines upon default. Moreover, following a default the model does not need
an exogenous output loss but endogenously generates GDP losses, partially from real
depreciation, partially from production activity decline, as in the data.
This model also predicts lasting welfare gains through the real exchange rate chan-
nel for the creditor country, but relatively short-lived welfare losses for the borrower
country and the world during and after a sovereign default. Furthermore, this paper
offers interesting perspectives on how default penalty and consumers’ taste of foreign
imports may interact with default frequency. Surprisingly, default frequency is hardly
affected by either. The most important factor impacting default frequency lies in the
borrower’s degree of patience. However, a higher openness to foreign imports for con-
sumption or a higher default penalty through intermediate goods exports does allow the
borrower country to sustain a higher average debt-to-GDP ratio. But in the meantime,
the borrower country will also suffer from a larger welfare loss once it defaults.
Default penalty and consumers’ taste in foreign imports also impact the post-default
welfare of the creditor. All else being equal, if the borrower country increases its
unilateral openness to foreign import consumption, its post-default loss will become
larger, and the creditor country will enjoy a smaller gain due to limited favorable
real exchange rate changes. Therefore, in this case the world registers a larger loss.
Alternatively, all else being equal, a higher default penalty through intermediate goods
exports allows the creditor to gain more from the other country’s default through much
more favorable real exchange rates. Hence, the world registers a smaller loss.
It is worth noting that the story behind this model has the borrower country ex-
porting intermediate goods. This allows sovereign defaults to interact with vertical
integration. However, exporting intermediate goods is not necessarily the only story
that can be told by this model. The model setup here is sufficiently versatile to be
compatible with other stories that are also consistent with empirical observations. For
instance, instead of borrower country 2 exporting intermediate goods, it could receive
FDI k∗1 from country 1 to produce final goods 1 and exports them back to country 1.
When country 2 defaults, the FDI may decline, triggering changes in trade and the real
exchange rate.22 Or, as in Mendoza and Yue (2012), borrower country 2 could instead
import intermediate (capital) goods from country 1; and a default causes a decline in
22Fuentes and Saravia (2010) find that a default event can reduce FDI inflows by 72 percent.
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such imports. Those alternative stories can be supported by the same model setup
used here. The only adjustments needed are accounting for GDP, trade balances, and
trade flows. I have calculated the model results for the business cycle moments of these
two alternative stories, and have found that the key results remain the same.23
This line of research into the connections between default, income, trade, and ex-
change rate is far from complete. For instance, it would be interesting to study the case
when both countries suffer from productivity shocks. Valid questions to ask include:
how are the shocks transmitted across countries in a default model, and how are the
risks shared? In particular, this model, with risk-averse investors, has the potential to
explain why risk sharing worsens for emerging markets after financial integration (Bai
and Zhang, 2012). Moreover, introducing a better labor market, exchange rate regimes
(see Na, Schomitt-Grohe, Uribe, and Yue, 2014), and debt restructuring would all be
promising subjects for future research.
Appendix: Data Sources
GDP value (in USD) and volume (in index), trade value (in USD) and volume (in
index), trade as a share of GDP, real exchange rate, and consumption are from the
IMF and the World Bank. Real Effective Exchange Rates for Mexico come from FRED
maintained by the Federal Reverse Bank of St. Louis. Mexico’s domestic capital stock
is calculated by the author from combined data from FRED and the IMF.
I use Mexico’s treasury bill rates from the IMF as its sovereign bond interest rates,
and calculate the bond spreads with the U.S. government bond interest rates (FRED).
Mexico’s external public debt is from the combined sources of Mexico’s Secretary of
Finance and Public Credit and the IMF.
The frequency of defaults over the long term is calculated with information from
Reinhart (2010). Sample default episodes are based on Reinhart (2010), the treatment
dates from the Paris Club, and Mendoza and Yue (2012). Slight date adjustments
according to GDP fluctuations have been made with regard to the Paris Club dates to
reflect delayed treatments after defaults. The results are not sensitive to the default
date specifications.
23These results are not reported in this paper due to space limitation, but they are available upon
request.
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The annual data for the intermediate goods exports of multiple countries (see Table
5) come from the World Bank (WITS). The quarterly data for Mexico’s intermediate
goods exports is from Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI).
It is also cross-checked with Mexico’s annual intermediate goods exports data from the
World Bank.
Mexico’s total hours worked (quarterly) comes from FRED, and its total employ-
ment comes from the combined sources of the World Bank (WDI), the IMF, and
Mexico’s INEGI. Total FDI stock in Mexico is calculated using data from the OECD,
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and the IMF. Furthermore, according to
the UN’s 2013 report on Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and Caribbean,
about 4.4 jobs are created in Mexico for every 1 million USD invested from abroad
during 2003-2013. Using this number, I compute Mexico’s FDI related employment
according to its FDI stock data. Hence, Mexico’s domestic sector employment is its
total employment minus its FDI employment. In calibration, the data for labor share
in production is from the OECD. Canadian employment is from Statistics Canada.
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